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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
adherence to the Statute and admission of the terms of the oral contract
for the purpose of measuring damages. Since this does not violate the
policy and purpose of the Statute, it would seem more logical and equi-
table to award the specific thing promised rather than to attempt its
measurement in damages. In doing so, the statutory policy and purpose
would be preserved equally as well. It is submitted that the Kentucky
court has adopted- the preferable position.
J. LEVONNE CHAMBERS
Worknen's Compensation-Neutral Risks-Causal Relation
Between Employment and Injury.
The workman's compensation statutes of most states prescribe as
one of the requirements of compensability that an injury must "arise out
of" the employment' of the worker, thus demanding a causal relation
between the job and the injury. Professor Larson has adopted a useful
threefold classification of the tests employed by the courts to determine
if an injury meets this requirement. Risks are designated as personal,
job related and neutral.2 An injury resulting from personal risk is one
completely unrelated to the employment and therefore not compensable.3
The injury from a job related risk is strictly confined to the hazards of
employment and is always compensable. 4 The third category, neutral
risk, includes all risks not personal or job related.5 The establishment
of the causal relation, the "arising out of" the employment, is a difficult
problem in these neutral risk injuries. In determining compensability
in such cases the courts have used three theories-increased risk, actual
risk and positional risk. This note will examine each of these theories
and will attempt to determine the present position of North Carolina in
this area.
In Pope v. Goodsen6 a carpenter took shelter during a storm in a
partially completed building. He -vas wet from the rain and had a
nail pouch around his waist. As he stood near the window, lightning
struck the house, traveled down the window frame and passed through
1E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1958); S.C. CODE §72-14 (Supp. 1959); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65-7 (1950). Contra, N.D. REv. CODE § 65-0102(8) (1957) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 35-1-44 (1953). For a discussion of "arising out of," see Vause v.
Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951).
21 LAlsON, WoRxmEN's COMPENSATION § 7 (1952).
'Compensation was denied to an employee assaulted while working, where the
assault was motivated by domestic difficulties. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture
Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930).
'Compensation is so clearly appropriate that the issue is seldom litigated. For
"instance, if an operator of a saw were injured by a malfunction in that tool, the
risk is clearly job related.
'In neutral risks the cause of the harm may be known or unknown; this note
treats only the former type cases.6 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959).
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the nail pouch and the legs of the carpenter, causing his death. In
allowing compensation under the statute7 the court stated:
The generally recognized rule is that where the injured employee
is by reason of his employment peculiarly or specially exposed to
risk of injury from lightning-that is, one greater than other
persons in the community,--death or injury resulting from this
source usually is compensable as an injury by accident arising out
and in the course of the employment.8
The court followed the well-established majority rule9 in allowing
compensation because of the increased risk to the employee. The de-
termining factor in granting compensation under the increased risk is
the greater likelihood of injury to the worker than to the general public;
if his employment subjected the employee to the additional danger, com-
pensation is allowed.
There is no uniformity among courts which adhere to the increased
risk theory; opposite results have been reached on indistinguishable fact
situations,' 0 due to differences in defining the scope of the term "general
public." The Massachusetts court denied compensation to a laborer
whose foot was frozen while working outside before dawn in extremely
cold weather. The court stated, "In the performance of his work, there
is nothing to show that the employee was exposed to any greater risk
of freezing his foot than the ordinary person engaged in outdoor work
in cold weather."" On the other hand, in allowing compensation to the
widow of an employee who died from a heatstroke, the Texas court took
a more liberal view: "In the case before us the very work which the
deceased was doing for his employer exposed him to greater hazard
from heatstroke than the general public was exposed to for the simple
reason that the general public were not pushing wheelbarrow loads of
sand in the sun on that day.' l2
Increased risk has been found where the employment of the worker
has merely exposed him to the elements (or whatever the harmful force).
Thus, increased risk of sunstroke was found by the Oklahoma court
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1958).S249 N.C. at 692, 107 S.E.2d at 525. Deceased was "specially exposed" because
he was wet and wearing a nail pouch.
* !g., Bales v. Covington, 312 Ky. 551, 228 S.W.2d 446 (1950) ; Kaiser v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 440, 26 N.E2d 449 (1940); Hiers v. Brunson
Const. Co., 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E.2d 211 (1952). See generally 58 Am. JuR. Work-
men's Compensation § 260 (1948) ; 71 C.J. Workmen's Compensation § 469 (1935);
99 C.J.S. Workmet's Compensation § 249 (1958).
" An employee took shelter under a tree during a thunder storm and was struck
by lightning; increased risk was found in Nelson v. Country Club, 329 Mich. 479,
45 N.W.2d 362 (1951). Contra, DeLuca v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 94 Conn. 7,
107 Atl. 611 (1919).
x Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 545-46, 198 N.E. 760, 761 (1935).1 rAmerican Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 S.W.2d 1082, 1085-86 (Tex. Civr
App. 1938).
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when the work merely required that the employee be in the sun.13 In
most cases, however, there is an additional hazard more directly con-
nected with the job. Heat from molten lead,1 4 reflected heat and de-
flected breeze,15 and objects which attract lightning 6 have been found
to be such additional factors. In the single case 17 involving heatstroke
which has reached the North Carolina Supreme Court, the evidence
showed that the employee had been working with molten lead which had
raised slightly the surrounding temperature. The court allowed com-
pensation but indicated that had the additional factor not been present
recovery would have been denied. The increased risk theory has re-
ceived general acceptance throughout the United States and has been
applied to accidents caused by lightning,' 8 exposure,' 9 windstorms, 20
earthquakes, 21 and other neutral risks.22
While professing to follow the increased risk rule, some courts23
have developed the contact-with-the-premises exception. 24 Under this
exception when the worker has been injured by contact with part of his
occupational surroundings, regardless of the actuating force, sufficient
causal relation has been established and increased risk need not be shown.
This doctrine is illustrated by the statement, "If the bomb injures a
" The truck driven by the employee ran out of gas, and he suffered a sunstroke
while walking to a service station. Garfield County v. Best, 289 P.2d 677 (Okla.
1955).
1'Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623
(1945).
"
2 McNeil v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 129 Neb. 329, 261 N.W. 694 (1935).
10 Stout v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 289 Ky. 736, 160 S.W.2d 31 (1942).
1Felds v. Tompkins-Jenkins Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623
(1945).
"l Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 158 Fla. 192, 29 So. 2d 205 (1947);
Stout v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 289 Ky. 736, 160 S.W. 2d 31 (1942) ; Bauer's Case, 314
Mass. 4, 49 N.E.2d 118 (1943) ; State v. Ramsey County Dist. Court, 129 Minn.
502, 153 N.W. 119 (1915) ; Sullivan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 103 Mont. 117, 61
P.2d 838 (1936).10 Vukovich v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ariz. 187, 261 P.2d 1000 (1953) ; Larke
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320 (1916) ; Murphey
v. I.C.U. Constr. Co. 158 Kan. 541, 148 P.2d 771 (1944); Nelson v. District
Court, 138 Minn. 260, 164 N.W. 917 (1918).
20 Reid v. Automatic Elec. Washer Co., 189 Iowa 964, 179 N.W. 323 (1920);
Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 Pac. 72 (1922) ; Scott County
School Bd. v. Carter, 156 Va. 815, 159 S.E. 115 (1931) ; Scandrett v. Industrial
Comm'n, 235 Wis. 1, 291 N.W. 845 (1940).
" London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 202 Cal. 239, 259 Pac.
1096 (1927) ; Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 202 Cal. 247, 259
Pac. 1099 (1927).
22 Borgeson v. Industrial Comm'r, 368 Ill. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164 (1938) (stray
bullet) ; Lexington Ry. Sys. v. True, 276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (1939) (stray
bullet) ; Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938) (bitten
by mad dog).
"' Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940); Dunnigan v. Clinton
Falls Nursery Co., 155 Minn. 286, 193 N.W. 466 (1923); Industrial Comm'n v.
Hampton, 123 Ohio St. 500, 176 N.E. 74 (1931); Brooker v. Borthwick & Sons
(Australasia), Ltd., [1933] A.C. 669 (N.Z.).
24 This exception could fit the actual risk theory also, but only courts following
the increased risk rule have utilized it. Courts using positional risk would find
causation from the fact that the employee was on the job.
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workman directly he must show special exposure; if it injures him in-
directly by bringing the roof down on him, he can recover uncondi-
tionally." 25
While the contact-with-the-premises exception has not been applied
in North Carolina to an injury caused by an act of God, the court
apparently used this theory in allowing recovery in Perkins v. Sprott.2 6
In that case the employee suffered an injury when a baseball broke the
window of the truck he was driving and the shattered glass struck him
in one eye. In its brief opinion the court did not mention increased risk
but stressed the fact that the glass rather than the baseball actually
caused the injury. The decision clearly implies that compensation would
not have been allowed if the baseball itself had struck the employee.2 7
However, in Walker v. J. D. Wilkins, Inc.28 an employee was injured
when a tornado blew down the building in which he was working. The
injuries were caused by the falling debris, but compensation was not
granted because no increased risk was found. 29  This decision would
seem to be in conflict with the position taken in Sprott, but in Walker
neither the opinion of the court nor the briefs of the parties mentioned
the contact-with-the-premises exception.
The actual risk theory is a more liberal approach to the problem of
determining causal relation. Recovery is allowed if the employment
exposed the worker to a risk of the injury, and the likelihood of similar
harm to others in the community is not examined.30 This theory is
especially applicable to exposure cases, as the danger of freezing or sun-
stroke is common to many people in a designated area. An employee
who suffers a heatstroke while working in the hot sun might be denied
recovery under the increased risk theory, since everyone in the area is
subjected to the same risk.3 ' The actual risk theory would allow com-
"2Brooker v. Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd., [1933] A.C. 669, 678
(N.Z.).2"207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934).
""The injury to the plaintiff employee was the glass that hit him in the eye.
The baseball did not hit him." Id. at 464, 177 S.E. at 405. Compensation was
denied in two similar cases where a bullet struck the employee's eye directly. Bain
v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N.C. 466, 166 S.E. 301 (1932); Whitley v. Highway
Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).28212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89 (1937).
2The contact-with-the-premises exception was utilized in allowing recovery
on similar facts in Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E2d 328 (1940).
" Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945) (glass
cutter died from heat stroke); McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79
Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949) (worker in lumber yard struck by lightning) ;
Hughes v. Saint Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927) (grave
digger suffered heat stroke) ; Deziley v. Semet-Solvay Co., 272 App. Div. 985, 72
N.Y.S.2d 809 (1947) (struck by lightning while going to job); Eagle River Bldg.
& Supply Co. v. Peck, 199 Wis. 192, 225 NW. 690 (1929) (foot frozen in ex-
treme weather).
"' In denying compensation to a coalheaver who suffered a sunstroke, the court
stated, "It is urged that physical labor has a tendency to induce sunstroke. No
doubt it has, but physical labor is not a hazard peculiar to a coalheaver." Lewis
v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 Wis. 449, 453; 190 N.W. 101, 102 (1922).
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pensation because the employment required the employee to work in the
sun and subjected him to the danger of sunstroke.3 2 This theory elimi-
nates the problem found in the increased risk doctrine of defining the
scope of the term "general public."
The positional risk theory is the third and most liberal approach to
the problem; compensation is allowed when the employment caused the
worker to be in the position where the injury was received, irrespective
of the risk involved.3 3 The Colorado court in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Comr'n 4 allowed recovery for the death of a farm hand
killed by lightning. A concurring opinion summarized the holding and
illustrated this theory by stating:
An affirmance... established the rule that when one in the course
of his employment is reasonably required to be at a particular
place at a particular time and there meets with an accident, al-
though one which any person then and there present would have
met irrespective of his employment, that accident is one "arising
out of" the employment of the person so injured.30
The North Carolina Supreme Court has been presented with two
cases3 6 in which the application of the positional risk doctrine would
have allowed recovery.37  In both an employee had been struck by a
stray bullet, and in both compensation was denied because of the ab-
sence of increased risk.
In summary, North Carolina has adhered to the increased risk theory
by using comparative danger between the worker and the general public
to determine if causation exists between the injury and the employ-
ment.38 The term "general public" has been interpreted liberally, how-
"-In granting compensation to an employee who suffered a heatstroke, the
court stated, "Although the risk may be common to all who are exposed to the
sun's rays on a hot day, the question is whether the employment exposes the em-
ployee to the risk." Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 202, 156 N.E.
665 (1927).38Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927)(farm hand struck by lightning) ; Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199
La. 720, 6 So2d 747 (1942) (cyclone demolished building and injured employee);
Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 Nj. Super. 129, 93 A2d 598 (1952) (struck by arrow
shot by child); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Commn, 266 Wis. 81, 62
N.W2d 567 (1954) (assaulted by fellow employees for signing peace petition).
3,81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927).
' Id. at 236, 254 Pac. at 996.
"
8Bain v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N.C. 466, 166 S.E. 301 (1932); Whitley v.
Highway Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).
" See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 460,
305 P.2d 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ; Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 N.J. Super 129, 93
A.2d 598 (1952).
" Special danger was found where a night watchman was killed by an unknown
assailant. West v. East Coast Fertilizer Co., 201 N.C. 556, 160 S.E. 765 (1931).
Compensation was denied on the ground that the risk was common to the neigh-
borhood in Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356, 196 S.E. 342 (1938)(employee slipped on fruit peel in employer's parking lot). Increased risk was
found in Pope v. Goodsen, 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959), and Fields v.
Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623 (1945).
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ever to mean all persons in the general vicinity, not just those doing
the same or similar work. 9 The status of the contact-with-the-premises
exception is unclear due to an apparent conflict in holdings.40 Neither
the actual4 ' nor the positional4 risk theory has been adopted by the court.
JAmas H. CARSON, JR.
Wrongful Death-Measure of Damages-Evidence of
Retirement Income.
In the recent case of Bryant v. Woodlief' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that evidence of railroad retirement payments received
by the decedent is admissible on the issue of damages in a wrongful
death action.2 This holdings and the court's incidental discussion of the
measure of damages in North Carolina raises two questions. First, how
far will the court extend the holding in Bryant, which seemingly is in
conflict with prior decisions, to other types of income similar to that
involved in the principal case? Secondly, what inference can be drawn
from the inconsistency reflected in the court's discussion in Bryant?
The evidence admitted in the principal case is difficult to reconcile
with the tacit rule of past cases that wrongful death damages in North
" See Pope v. Goodsen, supra note 38; Fields v. Tompkins-Jenkins Plumbing
Co., supra note; 38 Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370
(1938).
" Perkins v. Sprott, 207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934) ; Whitley v. Highway
Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 SE. 827 (1931). The application of the exception
could leave the court in an illogical position if a case ever arose where one eye
was injured directly by an object and the other eye injured by shattered glass
from a window. Apparently compensation would be awarded for injury to one
eye under the premises exception but disallowed for the other under the increased
risk theory.
" The language in Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32
S.E.2d 623 (1945), strongly indicates that no recovery would be allowed for a
heatstroke suffered on a hot day unless some additional harmful factor were pres-
ent. The actual risk theory would require nothing more than labor in the hot sun.
Compare Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927).
"' Utilization of the positional risk doctrine would have allowed compensation
in Whitely v. Highway Conm'n, 201 N.C. 466, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).
1252 N.C. 488, 114 SE2d 241 (1960).
'Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618, 172 S.W.2d 447 (1943), was
relied upon in the principal case. Kentucky's death statute, Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130
(1959), has been construed to provide recovery for "loss to the estate." Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry. v. Bank's Adm'r, 153 Ky. 629, 156 S.W. 109 (1913). The North
Carolina statute, N.C. Gm. STAT. § 28-174 (1950), is given the same construction.
Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E2d 194 (1946).
'Other jurisdictions have reached the same result; Kowtko v. Delaware &
Hudson RL1L, 131 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Penn. 1955) (training subsistence payments
from the Veterans Administration); Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527, 151
N.E2d 120 (1958) (monthly pension) ; Trust Co. v. Cummings, 320 Ill. App. 437,
51 N.E.2d 616 (1943) (old age assistance); Jessee v. Slate, 196 Va. 1074, 86
S.E.2d 821 (1955) (monthly social security payments). And the measure of
damages used is not determinative of the question of the admissibility of such
evidence. Virginia, for example, allows such evidence and its measure is "loss to
certain near relatives.' Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 80 S.E.2d 561 (1954).
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